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1  Introduction 
Within less than three decades, climate change has devel-
oped from a rather obscure scientific topic into a key item 
on the global political agenda. It has also attracted strong 
attention in many areas of scientific research, including the 
social sciences. Social scientists, and notably governance 
specialists focusing on climate change have addressed a 
wide range of important questions, including the following: 
 
•  What are the key political challenges in establishing 
and implementing governance systems to cope with 
climatic changes? 
•  Why are some countries in the international system 
more cooperative than others in this respect? 
•  To what extent can local efforts in climate policy sup-
port national and global efforts? 
•  What are the main normative issues associated with 
climate change policy, notably, how should the costs 
and benefits associated with solving the problem be 
distributed across countries and time? 
•  Which policy instruments are likely to be more effective 
and/or efficient in dealing with climate change? 
 
In this contribution we focus mainly on the first four of 
these questions. The existing literature on particular cli-
mate policy instruments (e.g. carbon taxes, tradable per-
mits, joint implementation) is very large and has been 




1  These include regulations and standards, taxes and charges, 
tradable emissions permits, subsidies and tax credits, voluntary 
agreements between industry and government, awareness 
campaigns, government sponsored and/or subsidized R&D, and 
integration of climate policy objectives in development, trade, 
and investment policies. 
We start with an overview of the climate change problem 
(section 2), followed by a discussion of international institu-
tions that have thus far been established to cope with the 
challenge (section 3). We then look at the reasons why 
global cooperation for climate change mitigation is difficult 
to achieve (section 4). Section 5 shows that, even though 
cooperation at the global level is difficult, there is strong 
variation in countries’ level of effort in this respect. We 
examine how levels of effort can be measured and how 
variation in effort can be explained. After having moved 
from the global (systemic) to the national level of analysis, 
we also explore climate policy-making at the sub national 
level (section 6). Local policy-making is, from an analytical 
viewpoint, particularly interesting in the case of federal 
political systems. The chapter ends in section 7 with a brief 
discussion of normative issues. 
 Thomas Bernauer & Lena Schaffer – Climate Change Governance 
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2  The Problem 
2.1  Geophysical Aspects 
In contrast to the weather, which is highly variable both 
spatially and temporally, the global climate is much more 
stable. It can be regarded as the Earth’s average weather 
and/or its variability over longer periods of time (typically 
at least decades). Whereas the weather can be experi-
enced directly by humans, the climate is a scientific (essen-
tially statistical) construct. For instance, while tempera-
tures can easily vary by 20°C in a particular location within 
a single day, the average global temperature does not vary 
by more than 1–5°C within time-spans of thousands of 
years.  
 
Changes in the Earth’s climate took place also in pre-
modern times (before the industrial revolution). Such 
changes occurred due to non-human factors, e.g. changes 
in heat output of the sun and volcanic activity. However, 
starting in 1896 with the Swedish chemist Svante Ar-
rhenius, scientists have produced a mounting stream of 
evidence demonstrating that so called greenhouse gases 
(GHG) emitted by human activities are influencing the 
Earth’s climate as well.  
 
Several gases in the atmosphere, most notably water 
vapor and carbon dioxide (CO2), are instrumental in trap-
ping some of the sun’s energy to which the Earth is ex-
posed. This greenhouse effect is essential for life on Earth. 
Without this heat trapping the Earth would be more than 
30 ! colder. Yet, human activity, in particular the combus-
tion of fossil fuels (coal, oil, gas) and land-use changes, 
have led to a large increase in concentrations of GHGs in 
the atmosphere. Atmospheric concentrations of the two 
most important GHGs emitted by human activity, CO2 (car-
bon dioxide) and CH4 (methane)
2, were far higher in the 
 
2  Other important GHGs include nitrous oxide (N2O) and halocar-
bons. 
year 2005 than the natural range of these gases in the 
past 650.000 years. CO2 has increased from a pre-
industrial (i.e. prior to about 1750) level of 280ppm to 
379ppm in 2005, and CH4 from 715 to 1774ppm (IPCC 2007).   
 
Climate scientists have over the past several decades 
invested an enormous amount of effort in trying to under-
stand the causal pathways leading from 
 
1.  vastly increased anthropogenic GHG emissions since 
the industrial revolution (with a 70% growth in 1970-
2004 alone) to  
2.  growing atmospheric concentrations of GHGs to  
3.  changes in radiative forcing to 
4.  changes in temperature (about 0.75 ! over the past 
100 years, with more warming in northern latitudes, 
and greater warming over land than over the oceans) 
and precipitation to  
5.  various effects of changes in temperature and precipi-
tation on plants, animals, and humans. 
 
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, c.f. 
section 3.2), a large global network including thousands of 
scientists and also policy-makers, has so far issued four 
comprehensive reports. These reports summarize and 
assess the available scientific evidence on the causes and 
implications of climate change, as well as policy options for 
coping with the problem. The IPCC stands out, by orders of 
magnitude, as the largest and most tightly organized sci-
ence-policy nexus in the history of governance efforts in 
any policy-area we can think of. 
 
This unprecedented scientific effort has over the past two 
decades resulted in increasingly firm international agree-
ment that anthropogenic GHG emissions are responsible 
for a large part of the observed global warming trend. 
Interestingly, the main conclusion from this scientific effort 
is rather close to what Arrhenius argued more than 100 
years ago; that a doubling of CO2 concentrations in the The Problem 
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atmosphere would increase global average temperature 
by around 5°C (current estimates are around 1.5 to 4.5 de-
grees). More generally, the IPCC (2007: 10) notes that: 
„Most of the observed increase in globally averaged tem-
peratures since the mid-20th century is very likely due to 
the observed increase in anthropogenic (human) green-
house gas concentrations.“ 
 
Figure 1 illustrates that computer models trying to recon-
struct the empirical climate record tend to perform better 
once anthropogenic emissions are included alongside non-
human drivers of climatic changes. 
 
While ex post explanation of climatic changes in terms of 
anthropogenic GHG emissions is very complex, prediction 
of future temperature and precipitation is even more chal-
lenging. The main reason is that, besides incomplete un-
derstanding of geophysical mechanisms, there is great 
uncertainty concerning future GHG emissions. For instance, 
depending on assumptions about technological innova-
tions, economic growth (which in itself is hard to predict 
over several decades) may be associated with very differ-





Figure 1: Comparison of climate model predictions with empirical climate records. Blue = models including only natural 
causes. Red = models including natural and anthropogenic causes. Black line = decadal averages of observations 1906-2005 
plotted against the centre of the decade and relative to the corresponding average for 1901-1950. Dashed line = spatial 
coverage less than 50%. Blue shaded bands = 5 to 95% range for 19 simulations from five climate models using only the 
natural forcings (solar activity, volcanoes). Red shaded Bands: 5 to 95% range for 58 simulations from 14 climate models 
using both natural and anthropogenic forcings (Source: IPCC 2007).  
 
As illustrated by Figure 2, one IPCC scenario (A1FI) assumes 
rapid economic growth, rapid introduction of new and 
more efficient but fossil fuel intensive technologies, a mid 
century peak of global population, and a substantial reduc-
tion in regional differences in per capita income. In this 
scenario, global GHG emissions are predicted to increase 
from around 40 Gt CO2-eq/yr in 2000 to about 130 Gt in 
2100.  Another IPCC scenario (B1) assumes a convergent 
world with the same population, but rapid changes in 
economic structures toward a service and information 
economy, the introduction of clean and resource efficient 
technologies, and an emphasis on global solutions to prob-
lems of environmental sustainability. In this scenario, 
emissions are predicted to increase to about 30 Gt CO2-
eq/yr by 2100 (IPCC 2007, Special Report on Emissions 
scenarios).  Thomas Bernauer & Lena Schaffer – Climate Change Governance 
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Figure 2: GHG emissions scenarios: global GHG emissions 
(in GtCO2-eq per year) in the absence of additional climate 
policies: six illustrative SRES marker scenarios (coloured 
lines) and 80th percentile range of scenarios published 
since SRES (post-SRES) (gray shaded area). Dashed lines 
show the full range of post- SRES scenarios. The emissions 
include CO2, CH4, N2O and F-gases (Source: IPCC 2007).  
 
Because GHGs are quite long-lived, even very optimistic 
emissions scenarios are likely to result in considerable 
global warming. The IPCC (2007: 46ff.) notes that:  
 
„Anthropogenic warming and sea level rise would continue 
for centuries due to the timescales associated with climate 
processes and feedbacks, even if greenhouse gas concen-
trations were to be stabilized, although the likely amount 
of temperature and sea level rise varies greatly depending 
on the fossil intensity of human activity during the next 
century [...]. The probability that this is caused by natural 
climatic processes alone is less than 5% ...World tempera-
tures could rise by between 1.1 and 6.4 °C during the 21st 
century. Sea levels will probably rise by 18 to 59 cm [...]. 
There is a confidence level >90% that there will be more 
frequent warm spells, heat waves and heavy rainfall [...]. 
There is a confidence level >66% that there will be an in-
crease in droughts, tropical cyclones and extreme high 
tides [...]. Both past and future anthropogenic carbon diox-
ide emissions will continue to contribute to warming and 
sea level rise for more than a millennium.“ 
2.2  Social Implications 
The projected social implications of climatic changes de-
pend very much on projected emissions and their radiative 
forcing. The IPCC’s (2007) best estimates range from 
+0.6°C by 2090–2099, compared to 1980–1999, in the case 
of continuing year 2000 concentrations (which is next to 
impossible in view of still growing global emissions), to 
+2.8°C in a moderately optimistic scenario (A1B), to 4.0°C 
and more in pessimistic scenarios. Projected sea level rise 
by the end of the 21st century is up to 0.59 meters in the 
standard scenarios. In extreme scenarios, such as those 
involving a complete loss of the Greenland and West Ant-
arctica ice sheets, sea levels could rise by 7 meters or 
more. 
 
Besides the large natural sciences literature on the impli-
cations of climate change for weather patterns, water 
availability, natural disasters, plants, animals, and ecosys-
tems, a considerable social sciences literature on climate 
change implications has developed as well. This literature 
seeks to clarify the social, economic, political and security 
implications of climate change.  
 
The largest part of existing social sciences research exam-
ines climate change implications in terms of economic 
losses and other forms of social damage (e.g. changing 
livelihoods, public health problems, migration), as well as 
adaptive capacity (e.g. Adger 2010, Füssel 2010). By and 
large, this research arrives at the conclusion that poorer 
countries are at greatest risk, both in terms of exposure to 
climatic changes and sensitivity to such changes, and in 
terms of their capacity to adapt. Exposure, sensitivity, and 
capacity to adapt determine how vulnerable particular 
countries or social groups are to climatic changes (Füssel 
2010). 
 
Social scientists have also sought to quantify overall ef-
fects of climatic changes on economic growth in the past 
and project economic losses under different emissions and 
mitigation scenarios into the future (e.g. Stern et al. 2006, 
Stern 2008). Ex post statistical analysis has thus far pro-
duced some evidence that higher temperature and lower 
precipitation are associated with lower economic growth, 
particularly in Africa, though these findings are not very 
robust (e.g. Miguel et al. 2004, Dell et al. 2008, Bernauer 
et al. 2010).  The Problem 
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Estimates of future effects on economic growth under 
different climate scenarios are based on so called inte-
grated assessment models that explore national, regional, 
and global cost implications. The findings from these 
models vary enormously. Having reviewed many such 
studies, the IPCC (2007) for instance concludes: „Global 
mean losses could be 1–5% of GDP for 4 degrees of warm-
ing, but regional losses could be substantially higher.“ Yet, 
as illustrated by Figure 3, cost implications reported by the 
influential Stern Review (Stern et al. 2006) are substan-




Figure 3: Estimates of damage resulting from unmitigated 
climate change. Source: Tol and Yohe 2006. 
 
One of the principal sources of vast differences in esti-
mated costs of unmitigated climate change (i.e. costs in 
the absence of international cooperation and GHG emis-
sions cuts) is the discount rate. The discount rate captures 
the extent to which future losses are less important eco-
nomically than present losses. The reasons for discounting 
future losses are that people generally prefer the present 
to the future, that consumption will be higher in the future 
due to increased wealth (with decreasing marginal utility), 
that future consumption levels are uncertain, and that 
future technology may make it cheaper to cut emissions 
then. The higher the discount rate used to deflate the 
stream of future losses to a present value, the lower is the 
presently valued damage from future climate change. For 
instance, if we assume an annual discount rate of 3%, a 
climate damage of $100 occurring in 25 years is worth only 
$50 today. While some economists (e.g. Nordhaus 2010) 
use standard discount rates from the investment world 
(around 2–3%), others (e.g. Stern 2008, Cline 1999) argue 
that such discount rates are too high. They use discount 
rates in the order of 1–2%, which are close to real interest 
rates for government bonds. The choice of discount rate 
has important implications for the assessment of govern-
ance options and involves strong normative components, 
to which we return in the final section of the chapter (see 
final section of the chapter). 
 
Repeated statements by high-ranking politicians about 
climate change-related wars have triggered yet another 
intense research effort in which social scientists are exam-
ining the validity of this claim. US President Obama, for 
instance, claimed in 2009
3 that  
 
“The threat of climate change is serious, it is urgent and it 
is growing […] The security and stability of each nation and 
all peoples – our prosperity, our health, our safety – are in 
jeopardy. And the time we have to reverse this tide is run-
ning out.”  
 
The most likely scenario for an interstate war involves 
competition over scarce international water resources, 
food and energy, or mass migration (for extreme scenar-
ios, see Schwartz and Randall 2003). Interestingly, existing 
research offers virtually no historical evidence for climate 
related international wars. Whether climate change could 
increase the probability of intrastate (i.e. civil) war is more 
strongly debated. A few studies (e.g. Burke et al. 2009) 
identify such an effect for Africa in the 1980s and 1990s 
and make rather worrying projections for the future. Yet, 
these findings remain very much contested and other 
authors, using similar data, do not find a significant effect 
of climatic changes on the probability of intrastate war 
(e.g. Buhaug et al. 2008; Theisen et al. 2010; Bernauer et 
al. 2010). 
 
3  Delivering a speech at the climate change summit of the United 
Nations on 22nd of September 2009.  Thomas Bernauer & Lena Schaffer – Climate Change Governance 
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3  Evolution of the Global Governance System 
As noted above, science plays a major role in climate pol-
icy. Hence we start by discussing what are, from the view-
point of many scientists and policy-makers, the basic goals 
of the global governance effort. We then describe the 
IPCC, the principal global institution for knowledge-
generation in this policy area. Finally we discuss the UN 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) and the 
Kyoto Protocol (KP). The latter two are, from a legal view-
point, the backbone of the existing global governance 
system. 
 
3.1  Goals of the global governance 
effort 
A strong global consensus has emerged over the past few 
years that climatic changes must be addressed through 
mitigation of GHG emissions and, because some major 
climatic changes are unavoidable even with extremely 
ambitious mitigation efforts, adaptation. The key ques-
tions in this respect are:  
 
1.  by how much should GHG emissions be reduced, and in 
what time frame?  
2.  how much would this cost, and how should the burden 
be distributed among countries and over time?  
3.  how much should be invested in adaptation and who 
should pay for it? 
 
(1) The policy positions of many countries have, over the 
past few years, converged on the goal of limiting the 
global average temperature increase to 2°C, relative to the 
mid-18th century level. From the perspective of most scien-
tists, a temperature target makes more sense than an 
emissions or concentrations target because it is ultimately 
temperature that affects ecosystems and humanity. The 
2°C target emerged from discussions among scientists and 
policy-makers in Germany in the mid-1990s. The 2°C tem-
perature increase was initially used as a rather arbitrarily 
chosen parameter to examine climate change impacts, 
e.g. impacts on the Earth’s major ice sheets. When many 
models indicated major damages or uncertainties beyond 
that level (e.g. with respect to the long-term stability of the 
Greenland ice sheet), the two degrees developed into a 
political target, even though there is no clear-cut scientific 
reason for this particular choice. 
 
Recent calculations by Allen et al. (2009) show that it 
would be necessary to limit total CO2 emissions in the 
2000 – 2050 period to 1000 billion tons in order to meet 
the 2°C target. One third of this CO2 budget has already 
been used in 2000–2009. Consequently, emissions would 
have to be cut by 50% by 2050, which would implicate 
reductions of 25–40% by industrialized countries until 
2020, and 80–95% until 2050. These targets are, by and 
large, in line with IPCC 2007 statements and the Stern 
Review. 
 
(2) Various studies have tried to estimate by how much 
global carbon prices (the total cost an emitter of a unit of 
GHG would have to pay for) would have to increase in 
order to reach specific reduction targets. The IPCC (2007) 
for instance notes a figure of $20–80 per ton of CO2 
equivalent by 2030 to stabilize GHG concentrations at 
550ppm (roughly a doubling of pre-industrial concentra-
tions, which were 280ppm then and 379ppm in 2005) by 
2100. Optimistic studies indicate $5–$65 (IPCC 2007). 
 
The IPCC’s best estimates of the costs of stabilizing GHG 
concentrations at 535–590ppm, which would probably 
meet the 2°C target, are in the order of a 0.1% reduction of 
average annual GDP growth rates. The Stern Report ar-
rives at a similar estimate.  
 
On the more pessimistic side, Nordhaus (2010) estimates 
that reaching the 2°C target would require a carbon price of 
$64 in 2010 (at 2005 prices), whereas the global average 
price today is around $5, and rapid growth of this price over 
the next few years.  Evolution of the Global Governance System 
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How to share the burden of GHG reductions remains dis-
puted. At the most general level, there is agreement that 
industrialized countries must shoulder most of the mitiga-
tion costs over the coming decades. The Kyoto Protocol 
(see below) in fact assigns that responsibility to this group 
of countries in the 2008-2012 period. But there is no con-
sensus on how to deal with very large, and rapidly growing 
developing countries, notably Brazil, China, and India. We 
return to this point in the final section of the chapter. 
 
(3) As noted by the IPCC (2007): „Much less information is 
available about the costs and effectiveness of adaptation 
measures than about mitigation measures.“ In any event, 
the costs are likely to be high and can most probably not 
be met by poor countries, which tend to be most vulner-
able to climatic changes. Estimates of adaptation costs 
range from lower two digit billion figures to $200 billion 
and more per year. At the Copenhagen conference in late 
2009, industrialized countries promised adaptation sup-
port in the order of $100 billion per year in the future. But it 
remains unclear how firm these promises really are, how 
much each industrialized country would contribute, and 
how the funding mechanism should be designed. 
 
3.2  IPCC 
The IPCC is an intergovernmental institution. Its task is to 
summarize and assess existing scientific knowledge on 
human-induced climate change and its impacts, as well as 
options for mitigation and adaptation. It was set up in 1988 
by the UN World Meteorological Organization (WMO) and 
the UN Environment Programme (UNEP). Its secretariat is 
located in Geneva, Switzerland. Its activities are funded by 
WMO, UNEP, and by direct contributions from govern-
ments.  
 
The IPCC does not carry out „in-house“ research, nor does 
it act as a monitoring agency in implementing global cli-
mate agreements (see below). It acts primarily as man-
ager of a large network of scientists worldwide. Its activity 
centers around so called Assessment Reports. Such reports 
have thus far been published in 1990/92, 1995, 2001 and 
2007. The next report is scheduled for 2014. The scientists 
involved, usually several thousand from more than one 
hundred countries, review the relevant scientific literature 
and, with the help of lead editors, summarize and assess 
the existing knowledge. This process is organized in three 
working groups: Working Group I examines geophysical 
aspects of the climate system and climate change; Work-
ing Group II examines vulnerability of socio-economic and 
natural systems to climate change, consequences, and 
adaptation options; and Working Group III examines op-
tions for limiting greenhouse gas emissions and mitigating 
climate change in other ways.  
 
The IPCC also includes a „Task Force on National Green-
house Gas Inventories“. In the judgment of most observ-
ers, the work on the Assessment Reports proceeds largely 
according to scientific criteria of due diligence. However, 
the synthesis work and summaries for policy-makers are 
also exposed to political influence because the Panel, 
which is composed of government delegates from all 
member countries, ultimately decides on their adoption. 
Hence the wording in the summary for policy-makers (but 
not the content of the detailed reports by the working 
groups) is subject to some political negotiation. However, 
governments have thus far hesitated to modify, for politi-
cal purposes, the main conclusions drawn from scientific 
assessments.  
 
3.3  FCCC and Kyoto Protocol 
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (FCCC) was formally adopted at the Rio, or Earth 
Summit in 1992 (UN Conference on Environment and De-
velopment, UNCED). Its aim is the 
 
„stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the 
atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous an-
thropogenic interference with the climate system. Such a 
level should be achieved within a time-frame sufficient to 
allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to 
ensure that food production is not threatened and to en-
able economic development to proceed in a sustainable 
manner.“ (Art. 2, FCCC) 
 
This global treaty does not set forth mandatory emission 
constraints, overall or for specific countries. Yet it has es-
tablished the basic legal structure for future agreements 
and has defined, at a very general level, the goals to be 
achieved in climate policy. The FCCC entered into force in 
March 1994 and, as of late 2009, has attracted 192 mem-
ber countries. Supported by the IPCC Task Force on Na-
tional Greenhouse Gas Inventories and the FCCC secre-Thomas Bernauer & Lena Schaffer – Climate Change Governance 
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tariat in Bonn, Germany, the FCCC members have estab-
lished national inventories of greenhouse gas (GHG) emis-
sions and removals. These inventories served to identify 
the 1990 emission levels that are the benchmarks for 
emission reduction obligations under the Kyoto Protocol. 
The so-called Annex I countries (OECD countries and tran-
sition economies) are committed to periodically update 
these inventories. 
 
Since 1995 the member countries of the FCCC have met 
each year in Conferences of the Parties (COP). These 
meetings serve to review the implementation of the 
agreement and negotiate follow-up agreements. The 
most important outcome thus far is the Kyoto Protocol 
(KP). This Protocol was adopted in December 1997 and 
entered into force in February 2005 (after 55 countries 
representing 55% of global CO2 emissions in 1990 had 
ratified). The Protocol has (as of late 2009) 187 countries 
that have ratified it. The most important holdouts are the 
United States, Afghanistan, Somalia, and Taiwan. 
 
Under the KP, industrialized countries (Annex I countries) 
have undertaken to reduce six GHGs (carbon dioxide, 
methane, nitrous oxide, sulphur hexafluoride, hydrofluoro-
carbons, and perfluorocarbons
4), of which carbon dioxide 
and methane are the most important in terms of the size 
of their greenhouse effect. 39 of 40 potential Annex I 
countries (except the USA) have ratified, and 34 countries 
have committed to emission reductions – 5 of the KP An-
nex I members are allowed to maintain or increase their 
1990 emission levels (e.g. Russia, Australia, Iceland). The 
European Union is treated as a “bubble”: it received a 
single target and then allocated emission rights to its 
member countries. Total reductions are supposed to be in 
the order of 5.2% by 2012, from the 1990 level (each GHG is 
weighed by its global warming potential). The KP also 
provides for "flexible mechanisms", such as emissions 
trading, the clean development mechanism, and joint 
implementation. The purpose of these economic instru-
ments is to make GHG emissions cuts more cost-efficient, 
with the assumption that countries are willing to curb their 
emissions more if doing so is cheaper. Monitoring of com-
pliance relies primarily on annual reports of GHG emissions 
 
4  CO2, CH4, N2O, HFC, PFC, SF6. 
by Annex I countries and (on a voluntary basis) by other 
countries.  
 
Most observers of the KP agree that many Annex I coun-
tries are currently experiencing difficulties in meeting their 
emissions targets domestically and are likely to make use 
of flexible mechanisms in order to be able to meet their 
legal obligations. Also, the USA, which has not ratified the 
KP but could still implement its Kyoto targets voluntarily, 
has increased its emissions quite dramatically (its Kyoto 
target was –7% relative to the 1990 level). Moreover, nego-
tiations on a follow-up agreement to the KP, which ends in 
2012, have thus far failed, most recently in Copenhagen. A 
recent study (Rogelj et al. 2010) suggest that, even if all 
unilateral reduction pledges made at Copenhagen were 
implemented, the probability of limiting global warming to 
3°C by 2100 would only be 50%, while global emissions 
would increase by 20% over 2010 levels. If emissions were 
cut by 50% by 2050 the probability of exceeding 2°C would 
still be 50%. 
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4  Why is International Cooperation Difficult? 
GHG reduction targets set forth in existing governance 
arrangements are still far from what would be required to 
limit temperature increases to 2°C. It remains unclear 
whether those rather non-ambitious targets will be 
reached by 2012, and even greater uncertainty exists with 
respect to unilateral pledges for the post-2012 period and 
the prospects for formal, follow-up international agree-
ments. 
 
At the most general level, namely the global political and 
economic system, climate change mitigation is difficult 
because it has the character of a global public good. 
Moreover, there is considerable disagreement over the 
costs and benefits of GHG mitigation. We discuss these 
two problems in this section. The following section (section 
5) sheds light on additional challenges to effective govern-
ance that emanate from country characteristics, such as 
differences in economic conditions and political institu-
tions, which make some countries more reluctant to coop-
erate than others.  
 
4.1  Global Public Goods and the 
Free-Rider Problem 
Climate change mitigation is one of the most typical public 
goods problems imaginable. Efforts to reduce GHGs corre-
spond by and large to an N-actor prisoner’s dilemma, 
which is similar to the tragedy of the commons (Hardin 
1968). The Earth has one indivisible atmosphere that can 
be used as a sink for GHG emissions worldwide; i.e. it is a 
common pool resource characterized by open access and 
rivalry in consumption (Ostrom et al. 1994). By implication, 
GHG reductions by any country generate costs and bene-
fits (in terms of avoided damages) for that country, but 
also benefits for other countries (positive externalities). 
Because in the climate case positive externalities from 
emission cuts are quite large in relation to national bene-
fits, international cooperation is necessary, but countries 
are reluctant to do so.  
For example, if Italy or Ireland were to cut its GHG emis-
sions by 20%, but no other country did the same, this re-
duction would probably create some local benefits of a 
non-climatic nature (e.g. less local air pollution, more tech-
nological innovation) and some, albeit minuscule climatic 
benefits. But the overall net benefit for the respective 
country would probably be very small and could even be 
negative. Assuming that countries follow a rationalist, 
interest-based logic when deciding on their climate policy, 
they will not implement any major unilateral GHG emission 
cuts unless other countries credibly commit to a similar 
policy (e.g. Sandler 1997; Barrett 2003; Mitchell 2006). The 
Kyoto Protocol reflects this problem very clearly: it requires 
ratification by 55 countries representing 55% of global 
emissions before entry into force. This clause protects 
countries from getting “caught up” in legal obligations to 
reduce emissions if they ratify early but other countries 
(and major emitters in particular) end up not joining. 
 
In essence, global governance in climate change policy 
uses mechanisms of reciprocity to prevent free riding on 
positive externalities. Reciprocity implies that each country 
exchanges its commitment to reduce emissions against 
similar commitments by other countries. The international 
climate change regime described above is quite typical in 
this regard. It offers an arena for step-by-step cooperation 
and exchanges of information (monitoring). As is the case 
with most global governance systems, the climate regime 
has no centralized enforcement mechanisms but relies on 
monitoring instruments inside and outside the regime to 
identify non-complying countries, and on decentralized 
enforcement in the form of political and economic pres-
sure imposed by governments and other actors on non-
complying countries. 
 
Several cases of successful international cooperation for 
the provision of global public goods, such as cooperation to 
protect the stratospheric ozone layer, demonstrate that 
problems of this type can be solved. Hence the public Thomas Bernauer & Lena Schaffer – Climate Change Governance 
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goods character of climate change mitigation alone can-
not explain why climate policy is progressing much slower 
than say cooperation in the ozone case (Barrett 2003, Oye 
and Maxwell 1994). The similarities and differences be-
tween the two cases, some of which are summarized in 
Table 1, suggest that we need to account for costs and 
benefits as well.  
 
Table 1 suggests that the costs of climate change mitiga-
tion are much higher than the costs of dealing with the 
stratospheric ozone problem. However, as discussed in the 
next subsection, mitigation costs and benefits remain 
contested. This circumstance, together with the global 
public goods character of the climate change issue, makes 
global cooperation difficult. 
Table 1: Stratospheric ozone and climate cooperation 










followed by protocols 
Framework conven-






Short to long term, 
clearly identifiable dam-
ages (e.g. higher skin 
cancer rates, crop dam-
age); developing and 
developed countries are 
approx. equally vulner-
able to damages 
Medium to long 
term damage that is 
difficult to quantify; 
developing coun-
tries are more vul-
nerable to damage 
Mitigation 
costs 
Less than $10 billion 
globally; substitutes for 
ozone depleting chemi-
cals (ODS) are available; 
phase-out costs are 
spread over around 2–3 
decades; costs are spread 
across a vast number of 
consumers, but per 
capita costs of more 
expensive substitutes for 
ODS are very small 
Several hundred 
billion $; substitutes 
are partly available; 
phase-out costs are 
spread over many 
decades; costs are 
spread across a vast 
number of consum-
ers, with rather high 
per capita costs 
 
4.2  The contested economics of cli-
mate change mitigation 
As noted above, uncertainty concerning the costs of failing 
to reduce GHG emissions (and, conversely, the benefits of 
GHG reductions) remains rather high. The same holds for 
the costs of reducing GHG emissions. Uncertainty with 
respect to benefits and costs combines to create serious 
difficulties in estimating the net benefits (benefits minus 
costs) of reducing emissions. The IPCC and the Stern Re-
view arrive at a favorable net benefit assessment because 
they use rather pessimistic assumptions about climate 
change related damages, rather optimistic assumptions 
about mitigation costs, and a low discount rate. For in-
stance, Watson (2009) argues that  
 
•  „do nothing“ would result in an average annual loss of 
5–20% of global GDP now and forever due to a 50% 
chance of exceeding a 5°C temperature increase by 
2100 (relative to pre-industrial levels);  
•  moving to a 550ppm trajectory would result in costs of 
1% of global GDP in 2050, with a 50% change of excee-
ding a 3°C temperature rise; 
•  moving to a 450ppm trajectory would cost about 3% of 
GDP in 2050 and would offer a 50% change of remai-
ning below a 2°C temperature increase. 
  
In such an assessment, the ambitious 450ppm target 
makes sense because it offers considerable net benefits. 
 
Net benefit estimates by other social scientists, e.g. Nord-
haus (2010) and Tol (2009) are more pessimistic. The 
main reason is that they use higher discount rates, which 
leads to lower estimates of the present value of (dis-
counted) future climate change-related damages and 
lower costs of mitigation the more mitigation is post-
poned. Based on their respective assessment, the IPCC and 
the Stern Review arrive at very different conclusions com-
pared to Nordhaus, Tol, and some other economists. While 
the former point to large net benefits of starting early with 
major GHGs reductions, the latter advocate starting slowly 
and implementing deep cuts only in the long run. Note, 
however, that none of these studies denies that human-
induced climate change exists and poses very serious 
problems, and that major emission cuts are necessary. But 
they disagree on when emissions should be cut by how 
much in order to generate net benefits to present-day 
decision-makers.  
 
It is easy to see why many policy-makers are more at-
tracted to the Nordhaus-type estimates than the Stern-
type estimates. Policies that incur rather high costs in the 
short-term and uncertain, even though potentially high 
benefits in the medium to long run are inherently less 
attractive than policies that generate a “return on invest-
ment” within the near future.  
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5  Measuring and Explaining Variation in National 
Contributions to the Global Public Good 
Most research on climate change governance concen-
trates on describing and explaining the climate change 
policies of individual countries or regions. Rather few stud-
ies focus explicitly on explaining observed variation across 
a large number of countries in national contributions to 
climate change mitigation. The following section discusses 
how national contributions to global climate change miti-
gation have been measured. The subsequent section 
deals with the main explanations in the existing literature.  
 
5.1  Measuring Variation in Contri-
butions to the Public Good 
To explain differences in climate change mitigation efforts 
across countries, we need, first of all, indicators that pro-
vide accurate und useful information on various dimen-
sions of national mitigation efforts. These indicators must 
cover two principal dimensions: policy outputs and policy 
outcomes. Policy outputs include laws, regulations and 
various other types of policy measures that can tell us how 
serious or ambitious a government is about climate 
change mitigation. Policy outcomes are phenomena lo-
cated either at the interface of human behavior and the 
environment, such as emissions, or environmental condi-
tions mitigation policies are aiming at, such as GHG con-
centrations in the atmosphere.  
 
Existing research focuses mainly either on policy output or 
policy outcome, though some composite indicators have 
recently been developed to bundle information on differ-
ent facets of climate change mitigation efforts. Econo-
mists have concentrated mainly on environmental out-
comes, such as emissions, and usually explain those with 
economic factors (e.g. Holtz-Eakin and Selden 1995). The 
political science and international relations literature, in 
contrast, pays more attention to environmental policy-
making and thus also policy output, for instance interna-
tional political commitments (e.g. von Stein 2008, Ber-
nauer et al. 2010, Sprinz and Vaahtoranta 1994). Very few 
studies offer a direct comparison of differences in climate 
change policy output and outcomes  (see Congleton 1992; 
Bättig and Bernauer 2009, Ward 2008).  
 
Environmental performance indicators have become quite 
popular in research on sustainable development in recent 
years (e.g. Singh et al. 2009). Yet, the construction of such 
composite indicators is methodologically challenging and 
their validity is usually contested (e.g. Böhringer and Jo-
chem 2007, Singh et al. 2009). Freudenberg (2003: 29), for 
instance, advises researchers to bear the conceptual limits 
of composite indicators they use in mind and accompany 
them “by an account of their methodological limits and 
include detailed explanations of the underlying data set, 
choice of standardization technique and selection of 
weighting method”.  
 
To draw robust inferences about the determinants of 
cross-national and longitudinal variation in national cli-
mate change mitigation efforts we need data on many 
countries over longer periods of time. Such data is readily 
available for GHG emissions, and existing scientific de-
bates focus primarily on whether explanatory models 
should focus on emission levels or on trends, and which 
GHGs and sources should be included in policy outcome 
variables. The largest data gap exists with respect to policy 
outputs. Existing large-N data sets for climate change 
policy outputs are thus far rather simple in terms of the 
types of policy output they capture, and they are mostly 
cross-sectional (e.g. Bättig and Bernauer 2009, German-
watch 2010). Finally, large-N data on climate adaptation 
efforts does, unfortunately, not yet exist. 
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5.2  Explaining Variation in Mitiga-
tion Efforts 
The most prominent explanations of variation in mitiga-
tion efforts focus on economic factors, political factors, and 
risk-related factors. 
 
The Environmental Kuznets Curve and related 
determinants 
Among economists the most popular explanation for dif-
ferences in environmental behavior across countries and 
over time is the Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC).
5 The 
latter holds that an inverted u-shaped relationship exists 
between income and pollution. Grossman and Krueger 
(1993) are usually credited for the first empirical test of the 
EKC (c.f. Dasgupta et al. 2002, Dinda 2004) in their study of 
the relationship between pollutants (SO2 and smoke) and 
income per capita, where they identify such a relationship.  
 
Recent research argues, however, that economic growth 
has somewhat more complex effects on pollution, includ-
ing GHG emissions. Three types of effects are usually con-
sidered: a scale effect, a composition effect, and a techno-
logical effect. Since more economic output due to eco-
nomic growth tends to increase pollution and waste, eco-
nomic growth is assumed to have a negative scale effect 
on the environment. The composition effect is argued to 
have a positive impact on environmental performance 
because economies usually develop from (dirtier) manu-
facturing towards (cleaner) services industries. As long as 
the composition effect does not simply lead to a re-
location of dirty production to poorer and less regulated 
countries, the composition effect can also reduce global 
(rather than only local) pollution levels. Economic growth is 
usually associated with technological innovations that help 
replace old technologies with newer and cleaner ones 
(technology effect). In addition, growing income is pre-
sumably associated with increasing public demand for 
environmental protection once a country’s population has 




5  See also de Bruyn and Heintz (1998) and Dinda (2004). 
While the basic tenets of the EKC may well be plausible, 
critics argue that it conveys the message to developing 
countries that they should “grow first, then clean up” 
(Dasgupta et al. 2002: 147; Hill and Magnani 2002; and 
Huang et al. 2008). This has obvious implications for the 
discount rate (see section 2). There is a lively academic 
(and also policy) debate on the empirical relevance of the 
EKC in general and CO2 and other GHG emissions in partiu-
clar (e.g. Millimet et al. 2003; Galeotti et al. 2006). While 
many studies identify a statistically significant relationship 
between income and different local pollutants (notably, 
SO2, NOx, CO; e.g. Lempert et al. 2009), global pollutants 
such as CO2 tend to either increase monotonically with 
income or have high turning points (e.g. Holtz-Eakin and 
Selden 1994, Dinda 2004, Neumayer 2002a). Some studies 
also point to a less favourable N-shaped curve to describe 
the relationship between income and CO2 (e.g. Galeotti et 
al. 2006; Dinda 2004). Moreover, Galeotti et al. (2006) find 
that the inverted u-shaped relation for some pollutants 
exists for OECD countries, but not for other countries
6. One 
conclusion from this research (c.f. Holtz-Eakin and Selden 
1994, Huang et al. 2008) is that gambling on an automatic 
reduction of GHG emissions as income grows would be 
risky and probably be a mistake.
7 
 
Yet another problem with empirical results for the EKC is 
that they do not take into account regulatory policies. This 
implies that it remains hard to tell whether observed de-
creases in GHG emissions are due to income, technology, 
or composition effects, or whether they are caused also by 
effects of regulatory policies or other factors (Hill and 
Magnani 2002, see below). Moreover, it remains con-
tested to what extent GHG reductions observed in some 
country are due to “bad” composition effects, meaning 
relocation of GHG-intensive production to pollution havens. 
The main long-term problem with “bad” composition 
effects is that they may allow richer countries to reap the 
“low-hanging” fruits and could eventually leave poor coun-
tries at the bottom of the risk-shifting cascade where 
beneficial composition effects must be achieved within the 
respective country. 
 
6  One explanation is that poorer countries are still on the upward 
slope of the EKC (Lempert et al. 2009) 
7  Huang et al. (2008: 246) argue that an expansion of the Annex I 
group under the KP is necessary.  Measuring and Explaining Variation in National Contributions to the Global Public Good 
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  Effects of the political system  
The political system of a country is likely to have implica-
tions for climate change mitigation policy (Fredriksson and 
Millimet 2004a). Many studies show that democracies 
tend to be better providers of environmental quality (e.g. 
Bernauer and Koubi 2009). Even though democracy offers 
greater political access also for non-green interests and 
the median voter may not always prefer more environ-
mental protection, existing theories expect, on balance, a 
positive net effect of democracy on environmental protec-
tion. The gist of the argument is that, in democracies, 
freedom of information and political rights enable citizens 
to acquire more information on environmental risks and 
express their demands more easily vis-a-vis policy-makers. 
The latter, in turn, have greater incentives than autocrats 
to meet citizen demands because they are more depend-
ent on broad public support, for instance in elections (Baet-
tig and Bernauer 2009, Gleditsch and Sverdrup 2002, Li 
and Reuveny 2006). Note that this argument is relative, 
not absolute. While the environmental performance of 
democracies may well be bad, the performance of non-
democracies is likely to be even worse. 
 
Whether democracies outperform non-democracies with 
respect to climate change policies is largely an empirical 
question. Existing studies on policy outcomes (usually 
defined as GHG emissions) arrive at mixed results. For 
instance, Gleditsch and Sverdrup (2002) find that democ-
racy is associated with lower CO2 emissions. Congleton 
(1992) finds that democracies emit less methane. Midlar-
sky (1998) observes that democarcies emit more CO2. Li & 
Reuveny (2006) find that democracy is associated with 
less per capita CO2 emissions. 
 
The relationship between democracy and climate policy 
output appears to be more robust than the relationship 
between democracy and climate policy outcomes (e.g. 
Neumayer 2002b). Von Stein (2008) observes a positive 
effect of democracy on climate change treaty participa-
tion. Bättig and Bernauer (2009) compare climate policy 
output and outcomes side-by-side. They find that democ-
racies contribute more to the global public good in terms 
of policy output, i.e. political commitments, but that the 
effect on policy outcomes is ambiguous. They describe this 
result in terms of a “word-deeds” gap, which appears to 
be larger in democracies than in autocracies. Reasons 
include the fact that mitigation efforts have started only a 
few years ago, and that, relative to local public goods, such 
as air pollution, there is a stronger free-rider problem. One 
major research gap in this research area is whether the 
positive democracy effect is driven more by the demand or 
the supply side (e.g. Ward 2008, Baettig and Bernauer 
2009). 
 
Researchers have recently started to disaggregate democ-
racy and examine the implications of different types of 
democracy, such as presidential vs. parliamentary systems, 
consensus democracies vs. other types, etc. Ward (2008), 
for instance, finds that presidential democracies perform 
worse than parliamentary democracies in environmental 
terms. Fredriksson and Millimet (2004b) observe that 
governments set stricter environmental policies under 
proportional than under majoritarian systems. 
 
  Effects of the natural system 
The natural (i.e. geophysical climate) system may, on the 
one hand, influence the emissions behavior of countries. 
On the other hand, it may also affect their vulnerability to 
climatic changes and thus their willingness to contribute to 
the global public good. 
 
Neumayer (2002a), for instance, examines natural factors 
such as climatic conditions, the availability of renewable 
and fossil fuel resources, and transportation requirements. 
He finds that these factors have significant effects on 
cross-country differences in CO2 emissions, though the 
income level remains the most important determinant. 
Aldy (2005) examines U.S. states and observes that cli-
matic conditions and coal endowments are positively re-
lated to per capita CO2 emissions.  
 
Natural system characteristics may also contribute to 
variation in climate risk exposure, which in turn could af-
fect countries’ willingness to commit to climate change 
mitigation. Sprinz and Vaahtoranta (1994), for example, 
argue that countries facing greater vulnerability and lower 
costs of cooperation are more likely to commit to stronger 
international environmental policies. However, empirical 
research on climate policy has thus far not been able to 
identify such a vulnerability effect. For instance, Bättig and 
Bernauer (2009) do not find any evidence that climate risk 
exposure has a positive effect on policy output or policy 
outcomes. Their analysis uses a climate change risk expo-Thomas Bernauer & Lena Schaffer – Climate Change Governance 
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sure index (Bättig et al. 2007) and several other indicators 
for risk exposure. One potential explanation for the ab-
sence of a positive vulnerability-cooperation effect is that 
the available scientific information has not yet spurred 
sufficient public demand for risk mitigation. Another ex-
planation is that the most vulnerable countries may have 
greater incentives to invest in climate adaptation, which is 
a national, “private” good, rather than mitigation, which is 
a global public good associated with positive externalities; 
or, they may be poor countries that are unable to invest in 
either adaptation or mitigation.  
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6  Alternative Forms of Climate Change Governance: 
Local Dynamics in Federal Systems 
Mitigation of climate change through effective global 
treaties to which all countries adhere has proven very 
difficult. In this section we look at other forms of govern-
ance that have emerged out of this conundrum. The focus 
is on sub-national climate change governance.
8  
 
Local climate policy-making is particularly interesting in the 
case of federal political systems. One noteworthy example 
is the United States, a typical federal state that is also 
important because it accounts for around 25% of global 
GHG emissions, but has thus far refused to ratify the Kyoto 
Protocol. The absence of federal laws and regulations on 
GHG emissions has led to a plethora of state- and city-level 
initiatives over the past few years.  
 
As of June 2010, 32 U.S. states have adopted a climate 
action plan, 21 states have adopted GHG emission targets, 
and 12 states have adaptation plans (Pew Center 2010). 
Furthermore, the first mandatory cap-and-trade program 
for CO2 in the U.S. started in 2009 for the ten member 
states of the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI). 
Similar regional initiatives have been initiated in the West-
ern U.S. states as well as in the Midwest (Pew Center 
2010). At the level of cities, the U.S. Conference of Mayors 
Climate Protection Agreement (MCPA) is the largest 
agreement. It involves more than one thousand U.S. cities. 
It was initiated in February 2005 by the then Seattle mayor 
Greg Nickels. Yet another local initiative is the International 
Council for Local Environmental Initiatives (ICLEI)’s Cities for 
Climate Protection (CCP) program. The ICLEI is an interna-
tional initiative that involves around 600 cities worldwide. 
It started in 1991 and has also helped generate political 
 
8  For reasons of space, we cannot discuss yet other forms of 
governance in climate policy, such as public-private partner-
ships and civil society involvement. 
support for reducing local GHG emission in U.S. cities (Bet-
sill 2001).  
 
Such local and regional activities are interesting from an 
academic viewpoint. But they also beg the question of 
whether bottom-up activity can substitute for absent na-
tional level climate policy. Lutsey and Sperling (2007) ex-
amine the effects of decentralized climate change policies 
in U.S. states and cities on GHG emissions, exploring the 
development of emissions based on current inventories 
and chosen sub-national policies. They argue that “efforts 
of states and cities are so pervasive at this point that fu-
ture federal policy will benefit by adopting the most popu-
lar and best functioning GHG mitigation programs […]” 
(Lutsey and Sperling 2007: 683). Selin and VanDeever 
(2007) are less optimistic about the emission-reducing 
effects of local climate initiatives. But they also stress the 
importance of such programs because they allow policy-
makers to “[…] see which of the many available policy 
options are gaining support in the public and private 
spheres” (2007: 22) and thereby are most likely to influ-
ence future federal policy development. Tang et al. (2010) 
study 40 local climate change action plans in U.S. cities. 
They find that, although these plans reflect a high level of 
environmental awareness, they have only limited effects 
on emissions.  
 
While existing research has not yet been able to demon-
strate the effectiveness of local and regional initiatives in 
terms of reducing GHG emissions, recent research offers 
interesting insights into the factors that affect the dynam-
ics of such initiatives. Employing event history analysis, Vasi 
(2006) finds that adoption of the Cities for Climate Protec-
tion (CCP) program is driven by spatial or cultural proximity 
to earlier adopters, and that organizational embedded-
ness in transnational frameworks also fosters participa-
tion. With respect to CCP county-level participation pat-Thomas Bernauer & Lena Schaffer – Climate Change Governance 
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terns, Brody et al. (2008) observe that counties with land-
scape characteristics of high risk, low stress, and high op-
portunity are more likely to join the CCP campaign. Schaf-
fer (2010) examines county-level participation patterns for 
the Mayor’s Climate Protection Agreement. She highlights 
the importance of natural system characteristics, such as 
whether the county is a coastal county, as well as political 
preferences of the inhabitants to determine where partici-
pation rates in this initiative are highest. Lee (2009) uses a 
multilevel setting to analyze what cities participate inter-
nationally in the CCP and other networks, such as C40. 
Controlling for city and country-level variables, he finds that 
cities’ position in the global economy and transportation 
hub characteristics significantly influence participation in 
these networks. 
 
By and large, existing studies suggest that local and re-
gional climate policy initiatives have gained ground in 
recent years, particularly in federal political systems. There 
is little evidence that such initiatives can substitute for slow 
progress in adopting and implementing ambitious mitiga-
tion policy at national and international levels. Nonethe-
less, evidence from the U.S. and other countries indicates 
that such activities can serve as policy-experiments in 
trying to find efficient mitigation options and changing the 




7  Normative Issues  
We end this chapter with a discussion of two normative 
issues that have received particular attention in research 
on climate change governance (e.g. Paterson 2001, Allen 
2003, Klinsky and Dowlatabadi 2009, Vanderheiden 2008, 
Posner and Sunstein 2008, Johnson 2009). One concerns 
intergenerational fairness, the other concerns the fair 
division of responsibilities for mitigation and adaptation. 
 
As discussed above, there is strong disagreement in the 
scientific literature on whether and by how much future 
costs and benefits of climate change and its mitigation 
should be discounted when deciding today how much to 
invest in solving the problem.  
 
Some scientists (e.g. Nordhaus 2010, Lempert et al. 2009) 
view the climate problem as one of many problems policy-
makers need to deal with in parallel; so they need to weigh 
the costs and benefits and decide in which policy to invest 
more when and where. In their view, there is, from an 
economic perspective, nothing that makes e.g. investment 
in combating infectious diseases or maintaining law and 
order inherently different from investment in solving an 
environmental problem like climate change. They also 
assume that future generations will be wealthier and have 
more technological means to mitigate climatic changes at 
lower cost. Hence they apply a higher discount rate to 
mitigation costs and also assume that damage from un-
mitigated climate change is less costly as it occurs in the 
future.  
 
Other scientists regard this position as unethical because it 
burdens future generations with an environmental prob-
lem. Many of them consider that only a small or even no 
discount rate is the appropriate choice, and the issue 
should be viewed from a “rights” perspective (e.g. Collier 
2010).  
 
The policy implications of these two contrasting views are 
quite obvious: the former position is associated with pro-
posals to start mitigation very slowly and invest more over 
the medium- to long-term; the latter position generates 
proposals to “front-load” mitigation efforts, i.e., start early 
and invest a lot in the short- to medium-term. However, 
most analysts agree that there is no scientific solution that 
could identify the “correct” discount rate.  
 
Yet another issue that has attracted considerable atten-
tion in social sciences research is the question of fair bur-
den sharing in mitigation and adaptation. Since past and 
current emissions have a greenhouse effect over many 
years to come and predictions of future emissions vary 
greatly, researchers have used complex models to calcu-
late how much particular countries and regions contribute 
to global warming. A paper by Elzen et al. (2005), for in-
stance, shows that responsibilities of specific regions can 
be calculated, though these responsibilities differ some-
what depending on the time period of emissions, the mix 
of GHG, climate impact indicators, and climate models. 
Such calculations indicate what share in temperature 
increases can be attributed to specific countries or regions. 
Elzen et al. find that the average contributions to the 
global mean surface temperature increase in the year 
2000 amount to around 40% for OECD countries, 14% for 
Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union, 24% for Asia, 
and 22% for Africa and Latin America. The OECD share 
decreases when later attribution periods are selected and 
increases for industrial latecomers, such as Asia. Including 
land-use related GHG emissions tends to reduce the OECD 
share at the expense of other regions. Other authors, e.g. 
Böhringer and Helm (2008) have sought to come up with 
specific modes of fair division based on compensation 
schemes. Again, such calculations show that normative 
assumptions (e.g. how industrial latecomers should be 
treated, which GHG should be considered) play an impor-
tant role in establishing responsibilities for and, conse-
quently, also burden-sharing formulas for climate change 
mitigation.  
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Finally, another line of research assumes that climate-
related damage is unavoidable even with the most ambi-
tious mitigation efforts. Accordingly, it asks who should pay 
for adaptation measures. Dellink et al. (2009) use two 
principles, historical responsibility for radiative forcing and 
capacity to pay, to estimate the shares of individual coun-
tries in the financial burden. The results turn out to be 
more sensitive with respect to variation in capacity to pay 
assumptions than model input concerning historical re-
sponsibility. The authors assume adaptation costs of USD 
100 billion per year and conclude that Annex I countries 
should contribute around USD 65-70 billion, which 
amounts to around USD 43-82 per capita and year in An-
nex I countries and USD 1-21 in non-Annex I countries. 
 Kapiteltitel 
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